

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOSEPH LANOUE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:22-cv-1111

v.

Honorable Ray Kent

UNKNOWN SIMONS et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (ECF No. 4.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. *See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act*, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); *McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.

“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” *Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.*, 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding

tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” *Id.* at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” *Id.* (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the *sine qua non* directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” *Id.* at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. *See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t*, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. *See Neals v. Norwood*, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a

consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).¹

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court will also deny Plaintiff’s motion to amend. (ECF No. 5.)

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues Prisoner Counselor/Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Unknown Simons and Sergeant Unknown Hicks.

Plaintiff’s complaint is brief. He states that from October 28, 2022, through October 31, 2022, his cell and the walkway by his cell were flooded with another inmate’s urine, blood, and

¹ *But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis.*, 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in *Murphy Bros.* was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); *Williams v. King*, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing *Murphy Bros.*); *Burton v. Schamp*, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).

feces. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff contends that at an unspecified time, he spoke to Defendants about the issue and they did nothing to address it. (*Id.*) Based on the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff's complaint to assert an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim. Plaintiff also references violations of MDOC policy. (*Id.*) He seeks \$600,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages. (*Id.*, PageID.4.)

II. Motion to Amend

Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend, seeking to add defendants and additional facts. (ECF No. 5.) With respect to amendments, although a district court may allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint before entering a *sua sponte* dismissal, it is not required to do so. *LaFountain v. Harry*, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); *see also Coleman v. Tollefson*, 733 F.3d 175, 177 (6th Cir. 2013) (discussing that a court need not permit a plaintiff to amend his complaint before dismissing under the PLRA). Leave to amend should be denied if the amendment would be futile. *See Marx v. Centran Corp.*, 747 F.2d 1536, 1550 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing *Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Further, leave to amend may be denied if the amendment would result in the improper joinder of parties or claims. *Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21* (setting forth that “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that permitting Plaintiff to amend his complaint would result in the misjoinder of claims and Defendants in this action.

Plaintiff seeks to add the following ICF personnel as Defendants: Officer Beeheler and Law Library Technician Philip Z. (ECF No. 5, PageID.30.) Plaintiff contends that on November 28, 2022, Officer Beeheler slammed Plaintiff's hand in his food slot and told Plaintiff that “he was going to kill [Plaintiff's] family member if [Plaintiff kept] speaking up to the courts.” (*Id.*) Plaintiff alleges further that on November 25, 2022, Philip Z. refused to provide legal assistance to Plaintiff, stating that he was not going to help because Plaintiff was “in pursuit of a civil action.” (*Id.*)

With respect to the joinder of parties and claims in a single lawsuit, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) limits the joinder of parties, whereas Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) limits the joinder of claims. Specifically, Rule 20(a)(1) governs when multiple plaintiffs may be joined in one action: “[p]ersons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: (A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1). Rule 20(a)(2) governs when multiple defendants may be joined in one action: “[p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Rule 18(a) states: “A party asserting a claim . . . may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a).

Courts have recognized that, where multiple parties are named, as in this case, the analysis under Rule 20 precedes that under Rule 18:

Rule 20 deals solely with joinder of parties and becomes relevant only when there is more than one party on one or both sides of the action. It is not concerned with joinder of claims, which is governed by Rule 18. Therefore, in actions involving multiple defendants Rule 20 operates independently of Rule 18. . . .

Despite the broad language of Rule 18(a), plaintiff may join multiple defendants in a single action only if plaintiff asserts at least one claim to relief against each of them that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and presents questions of law or fact common to all.

7 Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1655 (3d ed. 2001), quoted in *Proctor v. Applegate*, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2009), and *Garcia v. Munoz*, No. 08-1648, 2008 WL 2064476, at *3 (D.N.J. May 14, 2008); see also *United States v.*

Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142–43 (1965) (discussing that joinder of defendants is permitted by Rule 20 if both commonality and same transaction requirements are satisfied).

Therefore, “a civil plaintiff may not name more than one defendant in his original or amended complaint unless one claim against each additional defendant is transactionally related to the claim against the first defendant and involves a common question of law or fact.” *Proctor*, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 778 (internal quotation marks omitted). When determining if civil rights claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence, a court may consider a variety of factors, including, “the time period during which the alleged acts occurred; whether the acts . . . are related; whether more than one act . . . is alleged; whether the same supervisors were involved, and whether the defendants were at different geographical locations.” *Id.* (quoting *Nali v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.*, No. 07-10831, 2007 WL 4465247, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2007)). “[T]he policy of liberal application of Rule 20 is not a license to join unrelated claims and defendants in one lawsuit.” *Boretsky v. Corzine*, No. 08-2265 (GEB), 2008 WL 2512916, at *4 (D.N.J June 23, 2008) (citations omitted). Furthermore, Rule 20 does not permit a plaintiff to “incorporate into an existing action a different action against different parties and presenting entirely different factual and legal issues.” *Lovelace v. Lee*, No. 7:03-cv-395, 2007 WL 3069660, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 21, 2007).

Permitting the improper joinder in a prisoner civil rights action also undermines the purpose of the PLRA, which was to reduce the large number of frivolous prisoner lawsuits that were being filed in the federal courts. *See Riley v. Kurtz*, 361 F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2004). Under the PLRA, a prisoner may not commence an action without prepayment of the filing fee in some form. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). These “new fee provisions of the PLRA were designed to deter frivolous prisoner litigation . . . ‘by making all prisoner [litigants] . . . feel the deterrent effect created by liability for filing fees.’” *Williams v. Roberts*, 116 F.3d 1126, 1127–28 (5th Cir. 1997)

(quoting *Jackson v. Stinnett*, 102 F.3d 132, 136–37 (5th Cir. 1996)). The PLRA also contains a “three-strikes” provision requiring the collection of the entire filing fee after the dismissal for frivolousness, etc., of three actions or appeals brought by a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, unless the statutory exception is satisfied. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The “three strikes” provision was also an attempt by Congress to curb frivolous prisoner litigation. *See Wilson v. Yaklich*, 148 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 1998).

The Seventh Circuit has explained that prisoners like Plaintiff may not join in one complaint all of the defendants against whom they may have a claim, unless they satisfy the dual requirements of Rule 20(a)(2):

Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass that [a multi]-claim, [multi]-defendant suit produce[s] but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees—for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

A buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person—say, a suit complaining that A defrauded the plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to pay a debt, and E infringed his copyright, all in different transactions—should be rejected if filed by a prisoner.

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); *see also Brown v. Blaine*, 185 F. App’x 166, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2006) (allowing an inmate to assert unrelated claims against new defendants based on actions taken after the filing of his original complaint would have defeated the purpose of the three strikes provision of PLRA); *Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr.*, 136 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 1998) (declining to allow “litigious prisoners to immunize frivolous lawsuits from the ‘three strikes’ barrier by the simple expedient of pleading unexhausted habeas claims as components of § 1983 suits”); *Shephard v. Edwards*, No. C2-01-563, 2001 WL 1681145, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2001) (declining to consolidate prisoner’s unrelated various actions so as to allow him to pay one filing

fee, because it “would improperly circumvent the express language and clear intent of the ‘three strikes’ provision”); *Scott v. Kelly*, 107 F. Supp. 2d 706, 711 (E.D. Va. 2000) (denying prisoner’s request to add new, unrelated claims to an ongoing civil rights action as an improper attempt to circumvent the PLRA’s filing fee requirements and an attempt to escape the possibility of obtaining a “strike” under the “three strikes” rule).

Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s original complaint and the proposed amendment, the only connection between the two is the vague assertion that Officer Beeheler and Philip Z. took the actions they did because Plaintiff was “speaking up to the courts.” (ECF No. 5, PageID.30.) These additional facts and defendants are wholly transactionally unrelated to the claim set forth in Plaintiff’s original complaint. As an initial matter, although Plaintiff contends that Officer Beeheler and Philip Z. took actions against Plaintiff because he was pursuing a civil action, Plaintiff does not identify the specific civil action in question. That is, Plaintiff does not specifically allege that the present action is the civil action that he references in his proposed amendment. Regardless, assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff intended to reference the present action, the fact that Plaintiff believes that these individuals took these actions in retaliation for his lawsuit does not automatically grant Plaintiff leave to join unrelated claims together. After all, in the prison context, any adverse incident experienced by a prisoner could be claimed to be retaliation; however, such incidents are not necessarily transactionally related. Moreover, granting leave to amend would allow Plaintiff to circumvent the PLRA’s filing fee restrictions and allow him to avoid having to incur a “strike” for purposes of § 1915(g), should any of the proposed additional claims turn out to be frivolous. The Court, therefore, is obligated to reject a proposed misjoined amendment like Plaintiff’s. *See Owens v. Hinsley*, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011).

As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to show that the events set forth in his proposed amendment are transactionally related to the events underlying their original complaint. Therefore, allowing Plaintiff to supplement his complaint with the two additional named defendants and additional claims for relief would result in the misjoinder of claims and Defendants in this action. Plaintiff's motion to amend (ECF No. 5) will, therefore, be denied.²

III. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails "to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. *Id.*; *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). The court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a "'probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." *Id.* at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—that the pleader is entitled to relief." *Id.* at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); *see also Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71

² The denial of Plaintiff's motion to amend will be without prejudice to his right to assert his proposed claims in new lawsuits.

(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the *Twombly/Iqbal* plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

A. Eighth Amendment Claim

As noted *supra*, the Court has construed Plaintiff's complaint to assert that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that there was contaminated water in his cell and in the walkway by his cell from October 28, 2022, to October 31, 2022, but that nothing was done “to clean it up” during that period of time. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendants about the issue on an unspecified date, and they “did [not do] anything to address said issue.” (*Id.*). As explained below, the conditions described by Plaintiff, while certainly unappealing, fall short of the extreme deprivation required to state an Eighth Amendment claim.

With its prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to provide “humane conditions of confinement.” *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). However, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” *Ivey v. Wilson*, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987). Rather, “[t]he Eighth Amendment is concerned only with ‘deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation,’ or ‘other

conditions intolerable for prison confinement.”” *Richmond v. Settles*, 450 F. App’x 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981)). “[C]onditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” *Rhodes*, 452 U.S. at 347. As a consequence, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” *Hudson v. McMillian*, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting *Rhodes*, 452 U.S. at 347).

“Conditions-of-confinement cases are highly fact-specific, but one guiding principle is that the length of exposure to the conditions is often paramount.” *Lamb v. Howe*, 677 F. App’x 204, 209 (6th Cir. 2017) (“In general, the severity and duration of deprivations are inversely proportional, so that minor deprivations suffered for short periods would not rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, while ‘substantial deprivations of shelter, food, drinking water, and sanitation’ may meet the standard despite a shorter duration.” ((quoting *DeSpain v. Uphoff*, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001))). “It is well-established that the presence of *some* unsanitary conditions in a cell (including fecal matter) does not establish an Eighth Amendment claim, except in circumstances where the volume of matter and duration of exposure are extreme.” *Edge v. Mahlman*, No. 1:20-cv-892, 2021 WL 3725988, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2021). Allegations that a prisoner was consistently exposed to fecal matter for days are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. *Taylor v. Riojas*, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (concluding that a prisoner who alleged that he was placed in “shockingly unsanitary” cells for six days, one of which was covered in “massive amounts” of feces and the other of which was equipped with only a clogged drain to dispose of bodily waste, stated a violation of the Eighth Amendment); *Taylor v. Larson*, 505 F. App’x 475 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding a question of fact as to the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim

where the prisoner alleged that he was confined to a cell covered in fecal matter for three days); *DeSpain*, 264 F.3d at 974 (holding that exposure to non-working toilets and other inmates' urine and feces via standing water for thirty-six hours was sufficiently serious). However, the temporary exposure to human waste is not sufficiently serious so as to state an Eighth Amendment claim, particularly where the plaintiff does not allege to have been injured as a result. *See Lamb*, 677 F. App'x at 209–10 (discussing that inmate's four-hour exposure to human waste due to flooded toilet water insufficient to state Eighth Amendment violation); *Smith v. Copeland*, 87 F.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that there was no Eighth Amendment violation where an inmate complained that he was exposed to raw sewage from an overflowed toilet in his cell for four days, but suffered no physical harm); *Whitnack v. Douglas County*, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that deplorably filthy and patently offensive cell with excrement and vomit not unconstitutional because conditions lasted only for 24 hours).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that from October 28, 2022, through October 31, 2022, his cell and the walkway in front of it were flooded with another inmate's urine, blood, and feces, presumably from an overflowing toilet. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) As an initial matter, although Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendants about the condition of his cell and they did not remedy the issue, he does not indicate *when* he informed Defendants. (*See id.*) That is, Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating whether he told Defendants about the conditions of his cell on one occasion or on multiple occasions from October 28, 2022, to October 31, 2022. Because Plaintiff does not allege when he informed Plaintiff about the conditions of his cell, it is unclear whether Defendants "did [not do] anything to address said issue" on one occasion or repeatedly during the period in which Plaintiff's cell was flooded. (*Id.*) Such ambiguity is insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. *See Frazier v. Michigan*, 41 F. App'x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing

plaintiff's claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of right). Therefore, under the circumstances alleged by Plaintiff, he fails to allege sufficient facts to show that Defendants were aware of the conditions of his cell for the three-day period in question.

Moreover, setting this issue aside, while the conditions alleged by Plaintiff are unpleasant, Plaintiff's complaint is devoid of allegations that he suffered any injury from these conditions. Instead, Plaintiff's allegation concerns a temporary inconvenience, which does not trigger Eighth Amendment concerns. *Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); *see also J.P. v. Taft*, 439 F. Supp. 2d 793, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2006) ("[M]inor inconveniences resulting from the difficulties in administering a large detention facility do not give rise to a constitutional claim." (internal citation omitted)). Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim will be dismissed.

B. Violation of MDOC Policy

Plaintiff also suggests that Defendants violated MDOC policy by allowing the conditions noted above to last for three days. Section 1983, however, does not provide redress for violations of state law. *See Pyles v. Raisor*, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); *Sweeton v. Brown*, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). The only possible way a policy might enjoy constitutional protection would be through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

To demonstrate a due process violation, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) a life, liberty, or property interest requiring protection under the Due Process Clause; and (2) a deprivation of that interest (3) without adequate process. *Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird*, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006). "Without a protected liberty or property interest, there can be no federal procedural due process claim." *Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris*, 503 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing *Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972)). Courts,

however, have routinely recognized that a prisoner does not enjoy any federal protected liberty or property interest in state procedure. *See Olim v. Wakinekona*, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983); *Laney v. Farley*, 501 F.3d 577, 581 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007); *Brody v. City of Mason*, 250 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2001); *Sweeton*, 27 F.3d at 1164. Plaintiff's allegation that Defendants violated MDOC policy and procedure, therefore, fails to raise a cognizable federal constitutional claim.

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court's supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for violations of MDOC policy, this Court declines to do so. Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state-law claims. *See Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris* 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff's federal law claim, it should not reach state law claims." (citing *United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs*, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))); *Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc.*, 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, "[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues." *Landefeld*, 994 F.2d at 1182; *see also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply*, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding state law issues." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Dismissal, however, remains "purely discretionary." *Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)); *Orton v. Johnny's Lunch Franchise, LLC*, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs

against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, Plaintiff's state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

Conclusion

Plaintiff's motion to amend (ECF No. 5) will be denied without prejudice. Further, having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's federal claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). His state law claim regarding violation of MDOC policy will be dismissed without prejudice because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claim.

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). *See McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. *Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the \$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), *see McGore*, 114 F.3d at 610–11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis*, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the \$505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

An order and a judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: February 27, 2023

/s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge